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THE STATUS OF MULTIEMPLOYER BARGAINING UNDER
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
The recent decision of the National Labor Relations Board in
Evening News Ass'n permitting unions as well as employers to
withdraw unliaterally from established multiemployer bargaining
units may well have jeopardized the utility of such units as a
stabilizing force in labor relations. This comment examines the
past and present -policies of the NLRB with regard to multi-
employer collective bargaining and attempts to demonstrate that
the Board's conclusion in Evening News is neither dictated by
precedent nor based on- sound policy considerations.
M ULTIEMPLOYER bargaining1 has generally been credited with pro-
moting increased stability in collective bargaining relationships,2
I Generally the term "multiemployer bargaining" refers "to all situations in which
two or more independent employers bargain or negotiate jointly, through an agent,
committee or association, with one or more labor organizations representing employees
of the several employers, with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions
of employment." Rains, Legal Aspects and Problems of Multiemployer Bargaining,
34 B.U.L. Ev. 159, 160 (1954).
Although multiemployer bargaining may be of "almost every conceivable size, shape,
and character," there are basically two forms: (1) industrial, where a number of em-
ployers in the same industry join together for bargaining purposes, usually with the
same union, and (2) geographical, where employers from the same area, though not
necessarily from the same industry, bargain together. See Rains, supra at 160-61.
Geographically, multiemployer bargaining is typically divided into three major
subgroups: nation-wide, region-wide, and city-wide or local-area. See Pierson, Pros-
pects for Industry-Wide Bargaining, 3 IND. & LAB. REL. R V. 341, 347 (1950). Multi-
employer bargaining is probably most common on a city-wide or local-area basis.
See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Collective Bargaining with Associations and Groups
of Employers, in INDUSTRY-WIDE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: PROMISE OR MENACE 6 (Warne
ed. 1950). True industry-wide bargaining appears to be relatively rare. See Lester,
Reflections on the "Labor Monopoly" Issue, in id. at 30.
See generally PIERSON, MULTI-EMPLOYER BARGAINING: NATURE AND SCOPE 1-26
(1948); Steele, The Impact of Multi-Unit Bargaining on Industrial Relations, 20 So.
ECON. J. 130-31 (1953).
2 See NLRB v. Local 499, Teamsters Union, 353 U.S. 87, 94-95 (1957); GENERAL
SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
MULTIEMPLOYER ASSOCIATION BARGAINING AND ITS IMPACT ON THE COLLECTIvE BARGAINING
PROCESS 32 (Comm. Print 1964); Slate, Trade Union Behavior and the Local Employers'
Association, 11 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 42 (1957); Steele, supra note 1, at 133-36; Witte,
Economic Aspects of Industry-Wide Collective Bargaining, in INDUSTRY-WIDE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING: PROMISE OR MENACE 51 (Warne ed. 1950). See generally FEINSINGER,
COLLECTIvE BARGAINING IN THE TRUCKING INDUSTRY (1949); KPMt & RANDALL, COL-
MULTIEMPLOYER BARGAINING
particularly in those industries and localities characterized by a large
number of relatively small, highly competitive businesses.3 Negoti-
ating as a group, employers are in a better position to match the
strength of organized labor by presenting a united front to union
demands4 and utilizing the defensive lockout to counter union
LECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PACIFIG COAST PULP AND PAPER INDUSTY (1948); Somers,
The Multiemployer Proposals and the Coal Operators, 6 LAB. L.J. 296 (1955).
Critics of multiemployer bargaining do not deny that it leads to increased stability
in bargaining relations but question the assumption that "any policy which lays
claims to promoting stability" is necessarily good or correct. See Wolman, Industry-
Wide Bargaining, in INDUSmY-WIDE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: PROMISE OR MENACE 14
(Warne ed. 1950). See generally Van Sickle, Industry-Wide Collective Bagaining, in
id. at 42; Wolman, Industsy-Wide Bargaining, 1 LAB. L.J 167 (1949). These critics
argue that whatever is gained in the way of increased stability is more than offset by
the harm to the national economy resulting from "taking wages out of competition"
and vesting in union leaders "monopolistic powers." See Snavely, The Impact of
Multi-Unit Bargaining on the Economy, 19 So. ECON. J. 445, 452-57 (1953). It has
been suggested that increases in wages can be more easily passed on to the public
through multiemployer bargaining. See FIsHER, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE
BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY: AN APPRAISAL 42 (1948). Uniform wage rates achieved by
means of multiemployer contracts also tend to reduce the mobility of labor. See Mc-
Caffree, Regional Labor Agreements in the Construction Industry, 9 IND. & LAB. REL.
REv. 595, 607 (1956); Snavely, supra at 452. Other arguments against multiemployer bar-
gaining are that it creates the potential for crippling strikes, leads to "collusion" be-
tween management and labor, and impedes technological change. See Snavely, supra
at 453-57.
It would appear unsound, however, to criticize the practice of multiemployer bar-
gaining as a whole. Although wage uniformity appears to be the focus of the
criticisms directed at group bargaining, there are variety of types of uniformity and
the different economic effects produced thereby will cause the desirability of multi-
employer bargaining to vary accordingly. See KENNEDY, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WAGE
UNIFORMITY 39-40 (1949). Moreover, cases of true industry-wide bargaining, at which
most of the criticism has been aimed, are relatively rare. See note 1 supra. Further-
more, wage rates do not appear to have risen more rapidly under multiemployer than
single employer bargaining. See Lester & Robie, Wages Under National and Re-
gional Collective Bargaining: Experience in Seven Industries, in INDUSTRY-WIDE COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING: PROMISE OR MENACE 90-91 (Warne ed. 1950).
8 Multiemployer bargaining is most prevalent among relatively small producers. See
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 1, at 7-8. Recent surveys indicate that
in such industries as clothing, construction, hotel, longshoring, maritime, trucking
and warehousing, eighty to ninety percent of all unionized workers are covered by
multiemployer contracts. In the baking, printing, canning and textile industries from
sixty to eighty per cent are covered by such contracts. 1961 figures cited in GENERAL
SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, op. cit. supra note 3, at 6. Large corporations generally oppose
and do not participate in multiemployer bargaining. See statements by industry repre-
sentatives, in I.NDUSTRY-WIDE COLLECivE BARGAINING: PROMISE OR MENACE 94-106
(Warne ed. 1950). Few examples of multiemployer bargaining, therefore, occur in
the mass production industries. See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note I,
at 6. See generally PIERSON, MULTI-EMPLOYER BARGAINING: NATURE AND SCOPE (1948);
Chamberlain, The Structure of Bargaining Units in the United States, 10 IND. & LAB.
REL. REV. 3 (1956).
' See GARRET 9- TRIPP, MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS IMPLICIT IN MULTI-EMPLOYER BAR-
GAINING 3 (1949); KERR & RANDALL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 3; Slate, supra note 2, at
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'whipsaw" strike tactics.5  Despite the advantage of multiemployer
bargaining to employers in terms of increased bargaining power,
unions generally favor such bargaining.6 Through the multi-
employer device they gain not only the additional security inherent
in the multiemployer unit,7 but also a greater standardization of
wages and working conditions as a result of the group contract.8
46-48; Somers, Pressure on an Employers' Association in Collective Bargaining, 6 IND.
& LAB. REL. REv. 557, 568 (1953); Steele, supra note 1, at 133-34.
Other factors, of course, may influence the decision of a group of employers to
bargain on a multiemployer basis. In those industries faced with cutthroat competition
and in which labor constitutes a significant part of total production costs, employers
may desire to take wages out of competition. See FEINSINGER, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 31; SEYBOLD, THE PmLADELPHIA PRINTING INDUSTRY: A CASE STUDY 15 (1949); Steele,
supra note 1, at 357. Small employers may also bargain together to prevent the level
of wages in the industry from being set by a few large companies. See ABmsow,
PROBLEMS OF HOURLY RATE UNIFORMrY 20 (1949). Finally, multiemployer bargain-
ing may be particularly beneficial to employers in industries where employees change
employers on a daily, weekly, or job basis and hiring is conducted through a union
hiring hall. See Evening News Ass'n, 1965 CCH NLRB 16462, 16469 (dissenting
opinion). See generally SEYBOw, op. cit. supra; McCaffree, supra note 2.
5 "Whipsawing" is the term used to describe the union tactic of exerting strike
pressure against only one of a group of employers at a time in order to cause suc-
cessive individual employer capitulations. The union, subsidized by its nonstriking
members, is in a position to hold out for a considerable period of time while the
struck employer is under substantial pressure to surrender to union demands. By
being shut down while his competitors continue to operate, the struck employer is
threatened with serious market loss, but perhaps more important is his knowledge that
if he settles on union terms his competitors via the "whipsaw" process will eventually
accede to the same terms. Thus, faced with market losses if he does not surrender
to union demands and the prospect that if he does settle he will be at no competitive
disadvantage, the struck employer frequently agrees to union terms. It is often, there-
fore, only a matter of time before the union through this "chipping away" or "playing
off" process is able to impose its demands upon all of the employers in the group.
See Brundage, The Lockout and Multi-Employer Bargaining, 14 LAB. L.J. 976, 977
(1963); Note, 66 HARV. L. REv. 886, 895 (1953); Note, 3 STAN. L. REv. 510 (1951).
For a discussion of the employers' right to lockout to counter union "whipsaw" tactics,
see notes 145-66 infra and accompanying text.
See statements by representatives of organized labor, in INDUSTRY-WIDE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING: PROMISE OR MENACE 67-83 (Warne ed. 1950); notes 7-8, 10-11 infra and
accompanying text. See generally Twentieth Century Fund, Labor and Management
Look at Collective Bargaining: A Canvass of Leaders' Views, in INDUSTRY-WIDE COL-
LECTVE BARGAINING: PROMISE OR MENACE 106-11 (Warne ed. 1950).
Multiemployer bargaining reduces raiding, since a rival union must win over a
much larger number of employees in order to replace the incumbent union. In addi-
tion, it also reduces friction within the incumbent union. By promoting standardized
c6nditions it lessens the possibility that rival union leaders will seize upon differentials
as a "cause for agitation and means of political advancement." See Steele, supra
note 1, at 135. See generally KERR & RANDALL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 9-10, 28.
SThe goal of most unions is to achieve uniform pay scales within the various plants
that they represent in order to satisfy "the equation of equal pay for equal work."
See ABERsoLD, op. cit. supra note 4, at 5-6; Witte, supra note 2, at 50. Not only does
the satisfaction of this equation lead to a contented, membership (see note 7 supra),
but once an industry is completely organized by a single union, the threat of competi-
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Finally, there are economic advantages of group bargaining common
to both employers and unions. By negotiating a single contract
rather than many, employers may pool their resources and conse-
quently are often able to afford the services of a highly skilled,
professional negotiator,9 while unions are able to save the expense
and time involved to negotiate separate contracts with each em-
ployer.10 Moreover, welfare benefits such as pension plans, medical
payments, and unemployment compensation, as well as industry-wide
apprenticeship and training programs which would ordinarily be
beyond the capabilities of a single employer may be desirable by-
products of bargaining on a multiemployer basis.'
Whether multiemployer bargaining will continue to be a stabi-
lizing force in labor relations has been seriously questioned12 in
view of the decision by the National Labor Relations Board in
Evening News Ass'n,' 3 which permits unions to withdraw uni-
laterally from existing multiemployer bargaining units. At least one
commentator feels that this decision "may well augur a complete
upheaval in multiemployer bargaining."'14 Against this background
of uncertainty concerning the future of group bargaining, this com-
ment will examine the authority of the NLRB to certify multi-
employer units, the criteria utilized to determine if a particular
unit is appropriate, the rules governing withdrawal from multi-
employer units, and the impact of the Evening News decision.
tion from nonunion plants is removed. The union, therefore, no longer need worry
about nonunion plants underselling and taking away the markets of union operations,
nor about being "played off" by one employer against another with resulting wage cuts.
See FISHER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 42; GENERAL SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, Op. cit. supra
note 2, at 10. Moreover, the employers' will to resist union demands is considerably
weakened, since the increased costs occasioned by such demands can more easily be
passed on to the consumer. FISHR, op. cit. supra note 2, at 42. See generally
GARRET & TRIPP, op. cit. supra note 4, at 14; McCaffree, supra note 2, at 605; Steele,
supra note 1, at 134.
9 See McCaffree, supra note 2, at 606; Slate, supra note 2, at 48; Steele, supra note 1,
at 137.
1oSee id. at 137-38. See generally GARRET & TRIPP, op. cit. supra note 4, at 2-3;
KERR & RANDALL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 8-10; McCaffree, supra note 2, at 604.
"1 See GENERAL SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, op. cit. supra note 2, at 15; Steele, supra note
1, at 139.
22See 1966 A.B.A. LABOR RELATIONS SECTION 423-24; 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 651, 652
(1966); 44 TEXAS L. Rxv. 1047, 1050 (1966).
28 1965 CCH NLRB 16462, enforced sub nom. Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n
v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1967), 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 651 (1966), 44 TEXAS L. REV.
1047 (1966).
21966 A.BA. LABOR RELATIONS SECTION 423.
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AUTHORITY OF THE NLRB TO FIND MULTIEMPLOYER
UNITS APPROPRIATE
Section 9 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act requires that
the NLRB "decide in each case whether . . . the unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit,
craft unit, plant unit or subdivision thereof . . .",15 As early as
1938 the Board was confronted with the question whether section
9 (b) permits finding a multiemployer unit "appropriate." Although
the broadest unit expressly mentioned therein is that of "employer,"
the Board in Shipowners' Ass'n16 read section 9 (b) in conjunction
with section 2 (2),17 which defined "employer" as including "any
person acting in the interest of the employer," and section 2 (1),1 8
which included "associations" within the definition of "persons,"
and concluded that a multiemployer unit was appropriate where
prior bargaining had been conducted on a group basis. In a later
case the Board reasoned that a narrower construction of section
9 (b) would compel it to certify single employer units
in conflict with existing practices of collective bargaining which
are satisfactory to thd employers and to... the employees involved
[and thereby] ...disrupt and possibly destroy that stability in
employment relations which it was the very purpose of the Act
to foster.19
Only recently has this interpretation of the statute been passed upon
by a reviewing court,20 although on occasion a court had either ex-
15 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (b) (1964).
'- 7 N.L.R.B. 1002 (1938), appeal dismissed sub nom. AFL v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 933
(D.C. Cir. 1939), aff'd, 308 U.S. 401 (1940). See note 36 infra and accompanying text.
17 49 Stat. 450 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2) (1964).
The definition of "employer" in § 2 (2) was amended by the Taft-Hartley Act to read
"any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly." (Emphasis
added.) This change, however, had no effect on the Board's interpretation that the
statute permits certification of multiemployer units. After the passage of the amend-
ment, the Board held that an "exhaustive search and study of the legislative history
of the Act, as amended, fails to reveal an intent by Congress to limit the appropriate
unit ... to a single employer unit." Furniture Firms of Duluth, 81 N.L.R.B. 1318,
1320 (1949).
1849 Stat. 450 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1964).
29 Waterfront Employers Ass'n, 71 N.L.R.B. 80, 110 (1946).
20 The dearth of appellate court holdings concerning the statutory authority of the
NLRB to certify multiemployer bargaining units stems in part from the difficulty of
obtaining judicial review of a Board unit determination. Section 10 (f) of the NLRA,
provides for review by the courts of appeals only of "final orders" of the Board. 61
Stat. 148 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (f) (1964). Bargaining unit determinations, however,
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pressly2' or tacitly indicated its approval of the Board's established
practice of certifying multiemployer units.2 2 In NLRB v. Checker
Cab Co.,2- the Sixth Circuit unanimously upheld the Board's read-
ing of the act "as granting power to the NLRB to hold independent
employers.., to be joint employers for the purpose of defining an
appropriate unit."24
are not "final orders" within the meaning of that section. AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401
(1940). Consequently, they are reviewable only when the Board petitions a court of
appeals under § 10 (e) for enforcement of its order to bargain in the unit which it has
found appropriate. 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (e) (1964). The reason Con-
gress so severely limited court interference in representation matters was to prevent
"dilatory tactics" aimed at delaying collective bargaining. See Boire v. Miami Herald
Publishing Co., 343 F.2d 17, 20 (5th Cir. 1965).
Recognizing this congressional purpose, the federal district courts have restricted
the use of their equity powers to enjoin representation proceedings to three narrow
situations: (1) where the suit involves "public questions particularly high in the
scale of our national interest because of their international complexion," McCulloch
v. Sociedad National de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 17 (1963); (2) where there
is a substantial showing that Board action has violated the constitutional rights of
the complaining party, Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720, 725 (2d Cir. 1949); and (3) where
the Board has clearly acted "in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a spe-
cific prohibition in the Act." Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188 (1958). The third
exception has been confined to cases where there has been a "plain" violation of an
unambiguous provision of the act. See, e.g., Eastern Greyhound Lines v. Fusco, 523
F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1963); International Ass'n of Tool Craftsmen v. Leedom, 276 F.2d
514 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Consolidated Edison Co. v. McLeod, 202 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 302 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1962). See generally note 35 infra.
21 See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 449, Teamsters Union, 353 U.S. 87, 95 (1957), where
the Supreme Court indicated that in its view the failure of Congress to enact proposals
to limit or outlaw multiemployer bargaining at the time of the Taft-Hartley Act (see
note 19 supra) demonstrates that Congress intended "that the Board should continue
its ... practice of certifying multiemployer units ...." See also NLRB v. Lund, 103
F.2d 815, 819 (8th Cir. 1939), where the court stated that "it can make no difference
in determining what constitutes an appropriate unit for collective bargaining whether
there be two employers of one group of employees or one employer of two groups of
employees."
2 Various courts have enforced bargaining orders based on multiemployer unit de-
terminations without questioning the Board's authority under the act to find such units
appropriate. E.g., Universal Insulation Corp. v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 406 (6th Cir. 1966),
enforcing 149 N.L.R.B. 1397 (1964); NLRB v. Sheridan Creations, Inc., 357 F.2d 245
(2d Cir. 1966), enforcing 148 N.L.R.B. 1503 (1964); NLRB v. Jeffries Banknote Co.,
281 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1960), enforcing sub nom. Anderson Lithograph Co., 124
N.L.R.B. 920 (1959). See also AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940), affirming 103 F.2d
933 (D.C. Cir. 1939), dismissing appeal sub nom. Shipowners' Ass'n, 7 N.L.R.B. 1002
(1938).
23 367 F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1966), enforcing 141 N.L.R.B. 583 (1963).
24 367 F.2d at 698. The court's decision in Checker Cab was not surprising. Dur-
ing congressional consideration of the Taft-Hartley amendments, a proposal to prohibit
competing employers from engaging in multiemployer bargaining unless all plants
involved were less than fifty miles apart and employed less than one hundred persons
was narrowly defeated in the Senate by a vote of 44 to 43. See NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONs ACr, 1947, 1298-1302 (1948). This
defeat was later interpreted by the Supreme Court as indicating congressional approval
Vol. 1967: 558]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Although the admiinistrative criteria utilized by the Board to
determine the appropriateness of a multiemployer unit generally
require that multiemployer bargaining be initiated voluntarily,2 its
authority under the act is not conditioned upon the consent of the
parties. In Waterfront Employers Ass'n 26 the Board, declaring again
that it was empowered to find multiemployer units appropriate,
stated that it was "not persuaded otherwise by the fact that the
companies and employer associations have indicated that they do
not desire multiple-employer units. '27 The Board reasoned that to
hold that it was prevented by employer opposition from finding a
multiemployer unit appropriate would permit employers to shape
the bargaining unit at will, thus vesting in "the employers rather
than the Board the power to determine the appropriate unit."2 8
Perhaps the same reasoning underlies the Board's decision in Stoufler
Corp.,29 which held that a multiemployer unit was appropriate
despite the petitioning union's desire to bargain on a single employer
basis.
Similarly, the Board has not hesitated to find single employer
units appropriate even though both the employers and a union
desired a multiemployer unit.8 0 To permit mutual consent to be
determinative of the scope of the bargaining unit, especially in those
instances in which one union seeks a multiemployer unit and another
seeks single employer units, would again permit the employers
rather than the Board to determine the appropriate bargaining unit.
of the Board's practice to certify multiemployer units. See NLRB v. Local 449, Team-
sters Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957).
The only opinion to question the Board's authority to certify multiemployer units
is that of Member Styles dissenting in Continental Baking Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 777, 784
(1952). Styles reasoned that inasmuch as §9(b) does not expressly authorize the
Board to establish a bargaining unit broader than that of a single employer, the
Board's practice could only be supported on the ground that multiemployer units are
based on the mutual consent of the parties. Id. at 788. This view has never been
accepted by a majority of the Board and would appear erroneous in light of those cases
in which the Board has found a multiemployer unit appropriate over the objection of
one of the parties. E.g., Quality Limestone Prods., Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 589 (1963);
Checker Cab Co., supra note 23; Stouffer Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 1331 (1952); Johnson
Optical Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 895, amended, 87 N.L.R.B. 539 (1949); Waterfront Em-
ployers Ass'n, 71 N.L.R.B. 80 (1946).
21 See notes 42-67 infra and accompanying text.
-- 71 N.L.R.B. 80 (1946).27 Id. at 111.
28 Ibid.
" 101 N.L.R.B. 1331 (1952).
30E.g., Shreveport-Bossier Cleaners & Laundries, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 534 (1959):
Crucible Steel Castings Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1843 (1950).
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However, in those cases in which only one union is involved or all
the unions involved are in agreement as to the scope of the unit, the
Board has usually found appropriate the unit desired by the
parties.3 ' Even in this limited situation the Board has indicated
that it is not abdicating to the parties its authority under the act to
determine the appropriate unit.32  Rather, "the very fact that there
is no dispute of itself usually indicates that the proposed unit is
appropriate, and consequently in such cases the Board's unit finding
customarily coincides with that sought."' 3
CRITERIA EMPLOYED BY THE NLRB TO FIND MULTIEMPLOYER
UNITS APPROPRIATE
Since the Board has the authority under section 9 (b) to certify
multiemployer bargaining units, 34 the formulation of the criteria
for finding such units appropriate falls within its wide administrative
discretion. " Exercising this discretion for the first time in 1938 in
Shipowners' Ass'n,3 6 the Board relied primarily on the fact that the
employers involved had traditionally bargained with the incumbent
8 1 E.g., Rose Exterminator Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 59 (19653); Alliance of Television
Film Producers, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. 54 (1960); Broward County Launderers & Cleaners
Ass'n, 125 N.L.R.B. 256 (1959); Calumet Contractors Ass'n, 121 N.L.R.B. 80 (1958).
82 See 8 NLRB ANN. REP. 53-54 (1943).
33 Id. at 54. (Emphasis added.)
31 See notes 15-24 supra and accompanying text.
01 The NLRB has broad discretionary powers to determine the appropriate bar-
gaining unit, since no detailed criteria are specified by any absolute rule in the statute.
Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 30 U.S. 485 (1947). Congress, aware of the need
for flexibility in the determination of the appropriate unit, provided only "that the
selection be made so as to insure 'to employees the ful benefit of their right to self-
organization and to collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of
the Act...." Id. at 491. Thus, it is well settled that the courts will not substitute
their judgment for that of the Board and overturn a Board bargaining unit determina-
tion unless it appears to be arbitrary or capricious. E.g., Packard Motor Co. v.
NLRB, supra; Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146 (1941); NLRB v.
Quaker City Life Ins. Co., 319 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Smythe, 212 F.2d
664 (5th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Lettie Lee, Inc., 140 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1944). See
generally note 20 supra.
"17 N.L.R.B. 1002 (1938), appeal dismissed sub nom. AFL v. NLRB, 103 F.2d
933 (D.C. Cir. 1939), aff'd, 508 U.S. 401 (1940). See notes 16-19 supra and accom-
panying text. In Shipowners' Ass'n the Board found that all "the workers who do the
longshore work in the Pacific Coast ports of the United States for the conpanies which
are members of (the employer associations involved] . . . constitute a unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining ....... 7 N.L.R.B. at 1025. In a later
case, however, the Board recognized that it had overlooked three "exception ports"
which were separately represented at the time it found the coast-wide unit appropriate
and granted the workers in those ports the opportunity to choose by secret ballot
whether they desired to be represented in the coast-wide unit. Shipowners' Ass'n, 32
N.L.R.B. 669, 683 (1941).
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union on a group basis through an elaborate and formal organization
to which they had delegated broad authority to act in nearly all
matters usually regarded as within the scope of collective bargaining.
For several years thereafter the Board refused to find a multi-
employer unit appropriate unless the employers had actually dele-
gated to their association or common bargaining representative the
authority to enter into binding collective bargaining agreements 7
and had actually bargained as a group in the past.38
The evolutionary development of the present Board criteria
began in 1943. First, the Board in Rayonier, Inc.,3 9 abandoned
the actual delegation of authority requirement, at least where the
employers were members of an association, and took the more
realistic approach that a multiemployer unit was appropriate where
employers had bargained as a group for many years and had by
"customary adherence to ... uniform labor agreements... demon-
strated their desire to be bound by group rather than by individual
action." 40  Next the Board abandoned its bargaining history require-
ment as well. In George F. Carleton & Co.41 it held that three non-
member employers who had indicated their desire to bargain in a
multiemployer unit with the members of an employers' association
could properly be included in an appropriate multiemployer unit,
even though they were not members of the association, had not
delegated to the association the authority to bind them to a group
contract, and had not previously participated in group negotiations.
Thus, at this juncture a group of employers could determine the
appropriateness of a multiemployer unit simply by manifesting a
37E.g., Gulf Ref. Co., 21 N.L.R.B. 1033 (1940); Federated Fishing Boats, Inc., 15
N.L.R.B. 1080 (1939); Trawler Mars Stella, Inc., 12 N.L.R.B. 415, 424-25 (1939);
Monon Stone Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 64, 71-73 (1938), amended, 11 N.L.R.B. 14 (1939). But
see Stevens Coal Co., 19 N.L.R.B. 98, 106-09 (1940). Even where the employers
had bargained as an association, the Board would not find a multiemployer unit-
appropriate unless the employers had actually delegated to the association the
authority to enter into binding collective bargaining agreements on their behalf.
E.g., Sagamore Mfg. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 909, 916 (1942), overruled on other grounds,
Luther Mfg. Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 858, 864 (1945); Aluminum Line, 8 N.L.R.B. 1325, 1341,
amended, 9 N.L.R.B. 72 (1938).
"Even a formal association with binding authority would not suffice to make
a multiemployer unit appropriate in the absence of a history of actual bargaining
on a group basis, e.g., Pacific American Fisheries, Inc., 28 N.L.R.B. 244 (1940), unless
the employers and unions involved stipulated that such a unit was proper, e.g.,
Brenizer Trucking Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 810 (1942).
-" 52 N.L.R.B. 1269, 1274 (1943).
"Id. at 1274-75.
4154 N.L.R.B. 222 (1943).
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willingness to bargain as a group and to be bound by the resulting
contract.
The weakness of the Carleton test is readily apparent: it gave
to the employers the ability to determine the appropriate bargaining
unit notwithstanding disagreement by rival unions as to the scope
of the unit. Perhaps for this reason the Carleton test was expressly
overruled two years later in Advance Tanning Co.,42 where the
Board held that nonmembers of an employers' association could not
be included in an appropriate multiemployer unit unless they had
in fact participated in joint negotiations. This principle was re-
affirmed in Associated Shoe Industries, Inc.,43 where the Board stated
that
the essential element ... for establishing a multiemployer unit is
participation by a group of employers, whether members or non-
members of an association, either personally or through an author-
ized representative, in joint bargaining negotiations. 44
Thus, today the general rule is that a single employer unit is
presumptively appropriate,45 and a multiemployer unit is appropriate
only where there has been a substantial history of bargaining on a
multiemployer basis indicating an unequivocal intent to be bound
by group rather than individual action.46 Despite the absence of
4260 N.L.R.B. 923, 931 n.14 (1945). Prior to Carleton the Board had been
careful not to vest in either the employers or the union the power to determine the
appropriate bargaining unit. See notes 26-31 supra and accompanying text.
"81 N.L.R.B. 224 (1949).
"Id. at 229.
"E.g., Cab Operating Corp., 1965 CCH NLRB 15974; Carbondale Retail Druggists
Ass'n, 131 N.L.R.B. 1021 (1961); John Breuner Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 394 (1960); Schaeffers
Prospect IGA Store, 124 N.L.R.B. 1433 (1959); Arden Farms, 117 N.L.R.B. 318, aft'd,
118 N.L.R.B. 117 (1957); Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 738 (1951); Columbia
Marble Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1482 (1950).
a1 A substantial multiemployer bargaining history has been defined as actual par-
ticipation by the employers or their authorized representatives in group negotiations,
e.g., Morgan Linen Service, Inc., 131 N.L.R.B. 420 (1961); Columbia Marble Co., 89
N.L.R.B. 1482 (1950); Morley Mfg. Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 404 (1949), which unequivocally
manifests their intent to be bound by group rather than individual action, e.g.,
Quality Limestone Prods., Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 589 (1963); Chicago Metropolitan Home
Builders Ass'n, 119 N.L.R.B. 1184 (1957), for a period of time usually exceeding one
year, see, e.g., Miron Bldg. Prods. Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1406 (1956); Van Iderstine
Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 966 (1951); Jerry Fairbanks, Inc., 93 N.L.R.B. 898 (1951). It is
essential that such a bargaining history involve the same employers and union.
E.g., Chicago Metropolitan Home Builders Ass'n, supra; Bull Insular Lines, Inc., 107
N.L.R.B. 674 (1954).
If a sufficient history of group bargaining exists, a multiemployer unit will be
found appropriate even though the employers are in a different line of business
or the employees in the proposed unit have diverse skills. E.g., Safeway Stores,
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any formal organization or delegation ot authority, if joint bargain-
ing sessions have repeatedly resulted in. the negotiation of collective
bargaining agreements, a multiemployer unit is deemed appro-
priate.47  However, an actual history of multiemployer bargaining
is a prerequisite to finding such a unit appropriate. Therefore,
although a group of employers make joint decisions on labor rela-
tions48 or sign identical bargaining agreements, 49 unless they have
actually negotiated on a group basis the Board will not find a multi-
employer unit appropriate. 50
There are, however, two exceptions to the general rule requiring
a multiemployer bargaining history: (1) where all the parties in-
volved agree that a multiemployer unit is appropriate, 51 and (2)
where there exists common control of separate companies so that for
purposes of labor relations they are deemed to constitute a single
Inc., 98 N.L.R.B. 528 (1952); Cloth Laying Appliances Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 785 (1948).
But see Columbia Marble Co., supra. Furthermore, neither fluctuating membership
of the employer group nor the retention by the participating employers of the right
to approve or disapprove any agreement will preclude finding a multiemployer unit
appropriate if a sufficient bargaining history exists. Quality Limestone Prods., Inc.,
supra. On the other hand, an employer may be excluded from a multiemployer
unit where the relationship with the employer association has been terminated by
resignation or expulsion and the association refuses to represent the nonmember em-
ployer. Laundry Owners Ass'n, 123 N.L.R.B. 545 (1959).
ATE.g., Atlas Shower Door Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 96 (1961); Belleville Employing
Printers, 122 N.L.R.B. 850 (1958); Molinelli, Santoni & Freytes, 118 N.L.R.B. 1010
(1957); Charles H. Harper, 117 N.L.R.B. 1031 (1957); Balaban & Katz, 87 N.L.R.B.
1071 (1949); Air Conditioning Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 946, 951 . (1949), supplementing
79 N.L.R.B. 1896 (1948).
"1E.g., Electric Theatre, 1966 CCH NLRB 25422; L. C. Beauchamp, 87 N.L.R.B.
23 (1949). Membership in an employer association for the purpose of negotiating
collective bargaining agreements is not sufficient to constitute an appropriate multi-
employer unit, absent a history of actual bargaining on a group basis. E.g., Schaeffer
Prospect IGA Store, 124 N.L.R.B. 143 (1959); Morley Mfg. Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 404
(1949). Similarly, mere membership in a trade association for purposes other than
collective bargaining is not deemed a multiemployer bargaining history. E.g., Hot
Springs Bathhouse Ass'n, 13 N.L.R.B. 1066 (1961); Houston Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 132
N.L.R.B. 947 (1961).
"9E.g., Chester County Beer Distribs. Ass'n, 133 N.L.R.B. 771 (1961); Texas
Cartage Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 999 (1959); Plumbing Contractors Ass'n, 93 N.L.R.B. 1081
(1951); Morley Mfg. Co., supra note 48. However, the fact that the employers sign
separate contracts will not preclude the appropriateness of a multiemployer unit
if there is a history of actual bargaining on a group basis. E.g., Alton Ass'n of Petrole-
um Retailers, 124 N.L.R.B. 1213 (1959).
50E.g., Cab Operating Corp., 1965 CCH NLRB 15974; Shreveport-Bossier Cleaners
& Laundries, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 534 (1959); Arden Farms, 117 N.L.R.B. 318, aff'd, 118
N.L.R.B. 117 (1957); Crucible Steel Castings Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1843 (1950); Bear Creek
Orchards, 87 N.L.R.B. 1348 (1949).
51 Cases cited note 31 supra.
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employer.52 Because the bargaining history requirement appears to
have been formulated specifically to avoid vesting in the parties
rather than the Board the power to decide disputed claims as to the
scope of the appropriate bargaining unit,53 it is not surprising that
the Board has held that when a group of employers and the union or
unions involved desire a multiemployer unit, and no other party is
seeking single employer units, "collective bargaining history is not
prerequisite to finding the muliemployer unit appropriate."5 .
A more abrupt departure from established criteria occurred in
1963 in Checker Cab Co.55 when the Board found appropriate a
multiemployer unit of some 286 independently owned and operated
taxicab companies despite the employers' objections and the fact
that they had never before bargained as a group. In fact there had
been no collective bargaining between the parties whatsoever.5 6
Nevertheless, because the operation of Checker Cabs had been repre-
sented to the public as a single business enterprise and the Checker
organization was authorized by its member companies "to exercise
a substantial degree of control over the drivers of each of its mem-
bers," 57 the Board found Checker and its members "joint employers
in a common enterprise," 58 the equivalent of a single employer for
the purpose of making a bargaining unit determination: Analyti-
cally, the Checker rule appears analogous to the judicial doctrine
of "piercing the corporate veil." 59 Where a single business or eco-
nomic unit has been artificially carved into a number of separate
corporate entities, courts have traditionally disregarded the fiction of
separate identity in order to allow recovery against the assets of the
entire business. 60 Similarly, in Checker the Board disregarded the
separate identities of the composite companies in order to permit
" Checker Cab Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 583 (1963), enforced, 367 F.2d 692 (6th Cir.
1966), appears to be the only case as yet to adopt the common control rule. It was
distinguished in Cab Operating Corp., 1965 CCH NLRB 15974. See notes 55-60 infra
and accompanying text.
58See notes 28-33 supra and accompanying text.
U Western Ass'n of Engineers, 101 N.L.R.B. 64 (1952).
55 141 N.L.R.B. 583 (1963), enforced, 367 F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1966).
"6 141 N.L.R.B. at 584.
57 Id. at 587.
8 Ibid.
"9See generally Ixri & FRAMProN, BAsIc BUSINEsS AssoCIATIONs 711-20 (1963).
"0E.g., Holland v. Joy Candy Mfg. Corp., 14 Ill. App. 2d 531, 145 N.E.2d 101
(1957); Chesapeake Stone Co. v. Holbrook, 168 Ky. 128, 181 S.W. 953 (1916); see Mull
v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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their employees the opportunity to bargain in a unit as broad as the
actual employing entity.
At this point it is important to note that, although the Board
has emphasized the consensual nature of its multiemployer unit
criteria 1 and has on one occasion declared that "mutual consent
of the union and employers involved is a basic ingredient necessary
to support the appropriateness of a multiemployer unit,"0 2 the
absence of such consent has not precluded a finding of appropriate-
ness.63 Checker is an obvious example, 64 but even in applying the
Board's general bargaining history criterion, consent of the parties is
not always necessary. 65 In the typical case, where the employers and
one union desire to bargain on a multiemployer basis and a second
union desires single employer units, bargaining history is generally
dispositive of the rival union's claim as to the scope of the appropri-
ate unit.68 However, application of the bargaining history criterion
is not confined to this narrow situation but is also available to settle
disputes directly between the employers and the union as to the
appropriateness of a multiemployer unit. 7  Thus, although as a
practical matter the parties must acquiesce in the initiation of group
bargaining in order to develop a history of multiemployer bargain-
ing; it is clear that the Board will not be foreclosed from finding a
multiemployer unit appropriate if, at the time an official unit de-
termination is to be made, one of the parties disagrees as to the scope
of the unit, thereby destroying the mutuality of cpnsent.
O1 See, e.g., Evening News Ass'n, 1965 CCH NLRB 16462, enforced sub nom.
Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1967); Andes
Fruit Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 781 (1959).
02 d. at 783.
01 See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
0 141 N.L.R.B. 583 (1963), enforced, 367 F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1966). See notes 55.60
supra and accompanying text.
e5Quality Limestone Prods., Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 589 (1963); Stouffer Corp., 101
N.L.R.B. 1331 (1952); Johnson Optical Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 895, amended, 87 N.L.R.B.
539 (1949); Waterfront Employers Ass'n, 71 N.L.R.B. 80 (1946).
08 See cases cited notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text.
671n Waterfront Employers Ass'n, 71 N.L.R.B. 80 (1946), for example, bargaining
history was determinative in the absence of consent on the part of the employers
involved; the Board held that it was "dear from the history of collective bargaining"
that a multiemployer unit was appropriate. Id. at 112. The Board reached the
same conclusion in Johnson Optical Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 895, 897, amended, 87 N.L.R.B.
539 (1949), "particularly in view of the past bargaining history" on a multiemployer
basis. Similarly, when a union requested single employer units, the Board held a "10
year history of bargaining on a multiemployer basis ... enough to preclude a finding
in derogation of that history." Stouffer Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 1331, 1332 (1952).
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WITHDRAWAL FROM AN APPROPRIATE MULTIEMPLOYER
BARGAINING UNIT
A. Employer Withdrawal
After the Board has found a multiemployer unit appropriate, it
often develops that either an employer or the union desires to return
to single employer bargaining. In Bercut-Richards Packing. Co.,65
the first case to deal with the withdrawal issue, the Board granted to
employers an unrestricted right of withdrawal from existing multi-
employer bargaining units. It later reasoned that since its certifica-
tion criteria required a manifestation of intent to be bound by group
action in order to find a multiemployer unit appropriate, the "cor-
relative" standard for withdrawal from such a unit was necessarily
"evidence of an intent to pursue an individual course of action."0' 9
However, because a refusal to bargain in the appropriate unit consti-
tutes an unfair labor practice,70 the parties must know with reason-
able certainty the scope of the appropriate bargaining unit.y1 The
Board soon realized, therefore, that despite the purported logic of
permitting unrestricted employer withdrawal, 72 such a policy would
not provide the stability in bargaining relationships contemplated
by the act.73
- 68 N.L.R.B. 605 (1946).
69 Pacific Metals Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 696, 699 (1950); accord, e.g., Economy Shade Co.,
91 N.L.R.B. 1552, 1553 n.4 (1950).
70 Either a union under § 8 (b) (3) (see note 96 infra) or an employer under
§8(a) (5) (see note 110 infra) commits an unfair labor practice by failing to bargain
in good faith in the appropriate unit. E.g., Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 1966
CCH NLRB 25213 (1965), enforced sub nom. Publishers' Ass'n v. NLRB, 364 F.2d 293
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966) (employer); Evening News Ass'n, 1965 CCH
NLRB 16462, enforced sub nom. Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 372 F.2d
569 (6th Cir. 1967) (employer); Builders Institute, 142 N.L.R.B. 126 (1963) (union);
Cascade Employers Ass'n, 127 N.L.R.B. 488 (1960) (union).
71See Meltzer, Single-Employer and Multi-Employer Lockouts Under the Taft-
Hartley Act, 24 U. Cm. L. Rav. 70, 96 (1956).72 Although purporting to be a matter of logic, the Board's "correlative" standard
for withdrawal appears no more than a statement of policy. It does not necessarily
follow that unilateral withdrawal must be permitted merely because an intent to be
bound by group action was necessary initially to find a multemployer unit appropriate.
Moreover, the Board has not in all cases required that employers consent to bargain
on a multiempfoyer basis before finding such a unit appropriate. See notes 26-29
supra and accompanying text.
73 In the first case to impose restrictions on withdrawal from a multiemployer unit
the Board reasoned that to permit an unlimited right of withdrawal "would not
make for that stability in collective bargaining which the Act seeks to promote."
Engineering Metal Prods. Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 823, 824 (1950), In a later case the
Board justified its restrictions upon withdrawal as follows: "For the Board to tolerate
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Therefore, as early as 1950 the Board began to formulate rules
to govern employer withdrawal which would ensure a reasonable
degree of predictability as to the scope of the appropriate bargain-
ing unit, particularly during negotiations. Without abandoning the
theory that employers have a right to withdraw unilaterally from
multiemployer units, limitations were imposed upon the time and
manner in which that right could be effectively exercised. First, in
Engineering Metals Prods. Corp.,74 the Board held that withdrawal
could .be made only at an "appropriate time." A year later in
Washington Hardware Co., 5 it refused to recognize a withdrawal
because the employer had not manifested an "unequivocal intent"
to abandon the multiemployer unit.70 Finally, in 1958 in Retail
Associates, Inc.,"7 the Board in dictum clarified the meaning of
"appropriate time" and "unequivocal intent" and imposed the addi-
tional requirement that an employer must give adequate written
notice of its decision to withdraw.78
-. . inconstancy and uncertainty in the scope of collective-bargaining units would
be to neglect its function in delineating appropriate units . . . and to ignore the
fundamental purpose. of the Act of fostering and maintaining stability in bargaining
relationships. . . . T]he stability requirement of the Act dictates that reasonable
controls limit the parties as to ... withdrawal ... from an established multiemployer
unit." Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 393 (1958).
' 92 N.L.R.B. 823, 824 (1950).
71 95 N.L.R.B. 1001, 1003 (1951).
76 Washington Hardware Co. appears to be the first case to deny withdrawal
because the employers' intent was not unequivocal. Language suggesting that an
unequivocal intent would be required initially appeared in Pacific Metals Co., 91
N.L.R.B. 696, 699 (1950). See note 69 supra and accompanying text. Later, in per-
mitting employer withdrawal the Board stated that "if an employer at an appropri-
ate time manifests an [un]equivocal intent to pursue an individual course in his labor
relations, a unit limited to his employees alone becomes appropriate." Milk & Ice
Cream Dealers, 94 N.L.R.B. 23, 25 (1951).
7T 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 395 (1958).
' The written notice requirement announced for the first time in Retail Associates
apparently does not replace but merely supplements the Board's traditional require-
ment that withdrawal be unequivocal. This is evident from later decisions involving
employer withdrawal which have turned on the equivocalness of the employer's intent
to abandon group bargaining. E.g., Thomas H. Marrow Trucking Co., 1965 CCH
NLRB 16607; Universal Insulation Corp., 149 N.L.R.B. 1397 (1964), enforced, 361 F.2d
406 (6th Cir. 1966); Anderson Lithograph Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 920 (1959), enforced sub
nom. NLRB v. Jeffries Banknote Co., 281 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1960). In a subsequent
case the Board stated: "The standards established for withdrawal from a multiemployer
unit are ...that adequate written notice of an unequivocal intent to withdraw be
given prior to the date established by the contract for modification." Evening News
Ass'n, 1965 CCH NLRB 16470, 16471, enforced sub. nom. Detroit Newspaper Publishers
Ass'n v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1967). (Emphasis added.)
Aside from its importance in providing specific ground rules for employer with-
drawal from multiemployer units, Retail Associates was also viewed as involving
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Thus, under the Board's present rules, to be effective employer
wtihdrawal must be (1) timely, (2) unequivocal, and (3) in writing. 79
The "appropriate time" for withdrawal is any time "prior to the
date set by the contract for modification, or to the agreed-upon
date to begin multiemployer negotiations."80  Hence, once negotia-
tions for a new multiemployer contract have begun, withdrawal will
no longer be recognized by the Board and the employers must there-
after negotiate in good faith in the multiemployer unit.8 ' With
respect to the second element, "unequivocal intent," as defined by
the Board, means not only that an employer must express clearly
its decision to withdraw,8 2 but also that such a decision "must con-
template a sincere abandonment, with relative permanency, of the
multiemployer unit and the embracement of a different course of
bargaining on an individual-employer basis."83 An employer, there-
fore, who continues to participate in joint negotiations in derogation
of its expressed desire to bargain individually has not unequivocally
withdrawn from group bargaining.8 4  Moreover, "unequivocal in-
"a substantial departure from prior Board doctrine concerning the rights of unions
... to withdraw from a multi-employer unit." 1959 A.B.A. LABOR RELATIONS SEM-iON
17. See generally notes 94-109 infra and accompanying text.
1 E.g., Evening News Ass'n, supra note 78, at 16464; Quality Limestone Prods.
Inc., 1965 CCH NLRB 16086; National Elec. Contractors' Ass'n, 131 N.L.R.B. 550, 552
n.3 (1961); see Halquist Lannon Stone Co., 1966 CCH NLRB 25305; Anderson Litho-
graph Co., supra note 78.
80 Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 395 (1958).
s8E.g, Carmichael Floor Covering Co., 1965 CCH NLRB 16687; Quality Limestone
Prods., Inc., 1965 CCH NLRB 16086; Spun-Jee Corp., 152 N.L.R.B. 943, 945 (1965);
Kroger Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 569 (1964); Fairbanks Dairy, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 893, 897
(1964); Town & Country Dairy, 136 N.L.R.B. 517 (1962). Moreover, an employer who
fails to make a timely withdrawal but waits until a multiemployer contract has been
negotiated before indicating an intent to abandon multiemployer bargaining violates
the act by refusing to sign the group contract. E.g., Shamrock Systems, Inc., 1966
CCH NLRB 25119 (1965); Howard Disposal Corp., 1966 CCH NLRB 25130 (1965);
Strong Roofing & Insulating Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 9 (1965); McAnary & Welter, Inc., 115
N.L.R.B. 1029, 1032 (1956).
82 The employers intent to abandon group bargaining must be unambiguously com-
municated to the union. See, e.g., Korner Kafe, Inc., 1966 CCH NLRB 25415;
Thomas H. Marrow Trucking Co., 1965 CCH NLRB 16607; Walker Elec. Co., 142
N.L.R.B. 1214, 1221 (1963). A withdrawal conditioned upon the employer's satis-
faction with the terms of the group negotiated contract does not clearly evince a
desire to discontinue multiemployer bargaining. E.g., Universal Insulation Corp.,
149 N.L.R.B. 1397 (1964), enforced, 361 F.2d 406 (6th Cir. 1966); Carnation Co., 90
N.L.R.B. 1808 (1950).
83 Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 394 (1958).
1, E.g., Oak Tree Farm Dairy, Inc., 1962 CCH NLRB 17607; Anderson Lithograph
Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 920 (1959), enforced sub noma. NLRB v. Jeffries Banknote Co., 281
F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1960); see Walker Elec. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1221 (1963); Town &
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tent" also includes the element of good faith, in the sense that with-
drawal' must not be frivolously employed merely "as a measure of
momentary expedience, or strategy"8' 5 devoid of any serious desire or
intention to bargain on a single employer basis.8 6 Finally, besides
being timely and unequivocal, an effective withdrawal must be made
in writing.87 This requirement appears to contemplate no more
than a written communication to the union clearly expressing the
employer's decision to withdraw from the existing multiemployer
unit.88
However, the foregoing rules governing the time and manner of
employer withdrawal are subject to several qualifications. First,
withdrawal from a certified multiemployer unit will not be permitted
for a reasonable period of time, normally one year, after Board
certification of the unit. 9 Secondly, the Board's withdrawal rules
Country Dairy, 136 N.L.R.B. 517 (1962). Similarly, an employer who continues
to adhere to the terms of a group negotiated contract cannot claim to have un-
equivocally withdrawn from multiemployer bargaining. See Thomas H. Marrow
Trucking Co., 1965 CCH NLRB 16607.
85 Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 394 (1958).
86 In Retail Associates, Inc., supra note 85, at 394, the Board stated: "The element
of good faith is a necessary requirement in any . . . decision to withdraw, because
of the unstabilizing and disrupting effect on multiemployer collective bargaining
which would result if such withdrawal were permitted to be lightly made." Four years
later, the Board, in holding a withdrawal ineffective, approved a Trial Examiner's
finding that it "was more a tactical bargaining maneuver than a bona fide attempt to
withdraw from multiemployer bargaining." Town & Country Dairy, 136 N.L.R.B. 517,
523 (1962). A Trial Examiner in an opinion approved by the Board held that "even
more important" than the untimeliness of an attempted withdrawal is "secrecy and
want of good faith." Walker Elec. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1221 (1963). Moreover, in
several cases the Board has refused to permit withdrawal to be used as a tactical
measure to affect the outcome of a representation election. Standard Register
Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1361 (1958); Blue Ribbon Prods. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 562 (1953). See
also Bell Bakeries, 139 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1962), explaining Dittler Bros., 132 N.L.R.B.
444 (1961). But see Bearing & Rim Supply Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 101 (1953), where the
Board stated that whatever reason an employer has for abandoning multiemployer
bargaining is "immaterial."
87See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
Although there appears to be no case as yet holding a withdrawal ineffective for
lack of written notice, there is no doubt that the Board has adopted this requirement.
See Evening News Ass'n, 1965 CCH NLRB 16470, 16471. In a recent decision, for
example, the Board held that "the requirement of written notice to effect a withdrawal
from group bargaining presupposes the absence of consent to the withdrawal by other
parties involved and is inapplicable to actions . . . which are taken by mutual
consent." Halquist Lannon Stone Co., 1966 CCH NLRB 25305, 25307.
89 E.g., Southwestern Colorado Contractors Ass'n, 1965 CCH NLRB 16056, 16057-58.
The one-year rule stems from the principle approved by the Supreme Court that a
bargaining unit certification (whether multiemployer or not) based on a Board-
conducted election must be honored for a reasonable period of time. Brooks v. NLRB,
348 U.S. 96 (1954).
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are inapplicable (1) where the union consents expressly or impliedly
to the employer's withdrawal,90 or (2) where in the Board's view
"unusual circumstances" warrant an exception to its general rules.91
Under the union consent exception, compliance with the withdrawal
rules is unnecessary where the union by tacit agreement9 2 or by
actually bargaining with an employer on a single employer basis
recognizes an otherwise ineffective withdrawal.9 3 The exception
for "unusual circumstances" is presently undefined, there having
been no decisions allowing withdrawal on this ground.
B. Union Withdrawal
Although an employer's right to withdraw unilaterally from an
appropriate multiemployer unit was established as early as 1946,
94
whether a union had the same right was not so readily determined.
The earliest case to permit a union bargaining on a multiemployer
basis to engage in single employer negotiations was Morand Bros.
Beverage Co.95 In that case the Board held that a union violated
neither section 8 (b) (3)96 nor section 8 (b) (1) (B)97 of the act by
striking fewer than all the employer-members of a multiemployer
unit after an impasse in group bargaining had been reached.93
Balancing the instability which would result from a complete col-
lapse of negotiations against the benefits to be derived from con-
tinued bargaining with each employer individually, the Board
9"Cases cited notes 92-93 infra.
91 Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 395 (1958) (dictum).
92 E.g., Indiana Limestone Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 697 (1962).
03E.g., Atlas Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 27 (1964); C & M Constr. Co.,
147 N.L.R.B. 843 (1964); Metke Ford Motors, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 950 (1962).
,See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
"91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950), enforcement denied on other grounds, 190 F.2d 576
(7th Cir. 1951), on remand, 99 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1952), enforced, 204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.
1953).
"1 Section 8 (b) (3) provides that "(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents- ... (3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer,
provided it is the representative of his employees . 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (b) (3) (1964).
"Section 8 (b) (1) (B) provides that " (b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for
a labor organization or its agents- (1) to restrain or coerce . . . (B) an employer
in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the
adjustment of grievances ...... 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (1) (B) (1964).
98 Although the Board in Morand Bros. did not frame its discussion in terms of
withdrawal, nevertheless, by permitting the union to strike fewer than all the employer-
members of a multiemployer unit and then to negotiate with them individually, the
Board in effect allowed the union to withdraw from the multiemployer unit. See
Note, 66 HARv. L. REV. 886, 894 (1953).
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reasoned that the purpose of the act would best be served by per-
mitting unions to bargain on a single employer basis "where negotia-
tions on a multiemployer basis have broken down." 9'° By legalizing
"whipsaw" strikes against the employer-members of a multiemployer
unit, Morand Bros. undoubtedly provided the stimulus for the
development several years later of a correlative right on the part of
employers to lockout in order to defend against such tactics. 00
However, the most significant aspect of Morand Bros. in regard
to union withdrawal was the Board's view of the congressional intent
underlying section 8 (b) (1) (B) of the act. Faced with the argument
that Congress enacted this section to prevent unions from coercing
"an employer into joining or resigning from an employer associa-
tion,"' 0'1 the Board reasoned that to permit union withdrawal under
the circumstances would not conflict with that purpose, since it "was
not inconsistent with retention by the [employers] . . . of their
membership" in the representative association.102
During the eight years between Morand Bros. and the next
decision on the question of union withdrawal, it was generally
assumed that the Board intended that unions should not have the
same rights of withdrawal from multiemployer units as employers. 0 3
It came as somewhat of a surprise, therefore, when in 1958 in Retail
Associates, Inc. 04 the Board announced that in future cases, where
the issue of withdrawal was squarely presented, either "an employer
or a union" could effectively withdraw from an appropriate multi-
'9 91 N.L.R.B. at 418.
100 See notes 145-66 infra and accompanying text.
10191 N.L.R.B. at 425 (dissenting opinion).
102 Id. at 416. In subsequent cases the Board has held that whether a union
violates § 8(b)(1)(B) (see note 97 supra) by seeking separate negotiations or striking
fewer than all of the employer-members of a multiemployer unit depends upon
its motivation, that is, where it is attempting to force the employers to forego bargaining
through their selected representative or merely trying to reach a contract settlement.
Compare Cascade Employers' Ass'n, 141 N.L.R.B. 469 (1963), where the Board held
that union attempts to coerce withdrawals of employers from an employer association
violated 8 (b) (1) (B), with Cheney California Lumber Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 235, 242
(1961), aff'd, 319 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1963), where the Board held that a union did not
restrain or coerce an employer in the selection of its bargaining representative, since
the strike in question was not called because of any objection to dealing with the
employer association, but rather because of a disagreement over contract terms.
10 Cf., e.g., Local 449, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956)
(dictum), rev'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 87 (1957); Continental Baking Co., 99
N.L.R.B. 777, 778 (1952) (dissenting opinion); Jones, The NLRB and the Multiemployer
Unit, 5 LAB. L.J. 34, 38-39 (1954); Note, 66 HARv. L. REV. 886, 894-95 (1953).
10, 120 N.L.R.B. 388 (1958).
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employer unit by giving adequate written notice of its unequivocal
intent to abandon group bargaining prior to the commencement
of negotiations for a new multiemployer contract10° Although dic-
tum, the ground rules for withdrawal enunciated in Retail Associates
quickly became necessary requirements for effective employer with-
drawal. 106 Yet, it was not until 1965 in Evening News Ass'n'07 that
the Board opened wide the "door left slightly ajar"'08 in Retail
Associates by specifically holding that "the existing rules governing
employer withdrawal from multiemployer units should be applied
on an equal basis to union withdrawal from such units."'0 9
10 1n Retail Associates the employers had filed a petition for an election in the
existing multiemployer unit to test the majority status of the incumbent union,
but the union, to avoid the election, disclaimed representation of the employees
involved on a multiemployer basis. The Board, nevertheless, directed an election in
the multiemployer unit. However, before the Board was able to issue a formal
opinion, the union petitioned a federal district court to enjoin the Board from follow-
ing a "discriminatory rule." The court granted a preliminary injunction, holding that
because it was the Board's established policy to permit employers to withdraw from
multiemployer units virtually at will (see notes 68-93 supra and accompanying text),
denial of the same right to unions "would appear to be arbitrary in excess of the
Board's statutory authority, and to deprive [unions] . . . and the employees they
represent of due process of law .... ." Retail Clerks Local 128 X.. Leedom, 34 CCH
Lab. Cas. 96624 (D.D.C., April 29, 1958).
When the Board finally issued its opinion in Retail Associates, it made no reference
to the injunction and supported its decision on the ground that the union had not
effectively disclaimed representation. However, the Board then proceeded in dictum
to grant prospectively to unions the same rights as employers to withdraw from exist-
ing multiemployer units. The Board stated that "the Union argues strongly that
under the Board's rules it may never be given the opportunity to withdraw from a multi-
employer bargaining unit although such a right is accorded employers. While... this
extreme question does not arise in this case, we believe it reasonable to establish in
appropriate future cases, where such issues are squarely presented, specific ground rules
... to govern questions of representation in multiemployer bargaining units... . We
would accordingly refuse to permit withdrawal of an employer or a union from a
duly established multiemployer unit, except [upon written notice prior to negotia-
tions] .... ." 120 N.L.R.B. at 394-95. (Former emphasis in original; latter emphasis
added.)
10 See, e.g., Quality Limestone Prods., Inc., 1965 CCH NLRB 16086; Sheridan
Creations, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1503 (1964), enforced, 357 F.2d -245 (2d Cir. 1966);
National Elec. Contractors' Ass'n, 131 N.L.R.B. 550, 552 n.3 (1961); Anderson Litho-
graph Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 920 (1959), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Jefferies Banknote
Co., 281 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1960).
107 1965 CCH NLRB 16462, enforced sub. nom. Detroit Newspaper Publishers
Ass'n v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1967), 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 651 (1966), 44 TEXAS
L. REv. 1047 (1966).
108 1966 A.B.A. LABOR REI.LATIONS SECTION 423.
100 1965 CCH NLRB at 16467. Since Evening News, the Board has permitted union
withdrawal in two other cases. Adams Furnace Co., 1966 CCH NLRB 26371; Hearst
Consol. Publications, Inc., 1966 CCH NLRB 25213 (1965), enforced sub nom. Pub-
lishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 364 F.2d 293 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966).
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THE EVENING NEWS CASE
In Evening News several Detroit newspapers had bargained with
the union on a multiemployer basis for a period of twenty-five years.
About two months before the expiration of the then current collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the union, apparently relying on the with-
drawal rules announced prospectively in Retail Associates, served
written notice of its desire to negotiate future contracts on a single
employer basis. The newspapers, however, refused the union's re-
quest for individual bargaining and a complaint was filed against
them alleging an unlawful refusal to bargain in the appropriate
unit in violation of section 8 (a) (5)110 of the act. The Board agreed
with the Trial Examiner that the newspapers had indeed committed
an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union on a
single employer basis, since it was determined that the union had
effectively withdrawn from the existing multiemployer unit.1
After citing two judicial opinions which intimated that it would
be arbitrary and an abuse of discretion for the Board to adopt more
restrictive standards to govern union withdrawal than those appli-
cable to employers,112 the Board reasoned that
the basis of a multiemployer bargaining unit [being] . . . both
original and continuing consent by both parties, [it follows that]
the Board cannot logically deny [the union] . . . the same op-
portunity it allows employers of withdrawing from the multi-
employer unit by withdrawing its consent to such unit.113
Moreover, the Board could find no justification for treating em-
ployer and union withdrawal differently.114 The employers had
contended that more restrictive rules should govern union with-
120 Section 8 (a) (5) provides that "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer- . . . (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees .... " 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5) (1964).
12 1965 CCH NLRB at 16463.
112 Local 449, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956) (dictum),
rev'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 87 (1957) and Retail Clerks Local 128 v. Leedom,
34 CCH Lab. Cas. 96624 (D.D.C., April 29, 1958), cited in Evening News, 1965 CCH
NLRB at 16464.
"labid. at 16464. Member Brown, dissenting, disagreed that the continuing con-
sent of both parties is alone the basis for a multiemployer unit. He argued that
multiemployer bargaining history is a material factor in determining the appropriate
unit and that the statutory objective of promoting stable collective bargaining rela-
tionships would not be served by permitting a union to withdraw at will from an
existing multiemployer unit without showing a legitimate reason for doing so. Id.
at 16467-68.
21 1ld. at 16466.
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drawal on the ground that when a union withdraws from a multi-
employer unit it enhances its bargaining strength vis-&-vis the em-
ployers.1 15 More specifically, the employers were concerned that
union withdrawal would preclude them from utilizing a multi-
employer lockout to defend against "whipsaw" strikes."16  The
Board, however, rejected this argument on the ground that "the
Act nowhere says that, in determining the appropriateness of a
unit, the Board shall consider the relative bargaining power of the
parties.""17 In addition, it felt that the practical consequence of not
according unions the same right to withdraw that employers have
would either (1) discourage unions from bargaining on a multi-
employer basis, or (2) encourage unions already bargaining on such
a basis to stimulate employer withdrawals by insisting on demands
unacceptable to some employers." 8 Thus, "inequality of freedom to
withdraw ... could become a means of producing, not stability, but
friction and instability in the bargaining unit.""19
Because the Evening News decision hias caused alarm in some
quarters and may have an adverse effect upon the future of multi-
employer bargaining,120 its soundness warrants careful examination.
The majority chose to rely on two basic arguments: (1) under the
Board's established criteria for finding a multiemployer unit appro-
priate, it cannot "logically" deny either the employers or the union
the right to withdraw at will;' 2 ' (2) for the Board to adopt different,
115 Id. at 16464-65. The employers argued that when a union withdraws, it still
continues to represent all the employees that made up the former multiemployer unit,
while the employers are forced to bargain with the union individually. Hence, because
the union can maintain its organizational strength and at the same time preclude the
employers from bargaining with it as a group, the bargaining power of the former
employer-members of the multiemployer unit is significantly weakened. See note 4
supra and accompanying text.
218 1965 CCH NLRB at 16465. The employers' contention that union withdrawal
would preclude them from using the multiemployer lockout is another aspect of their
bargaining power argument. If employers could not combat "whipsaw" strikes with
a group lockout, their bargaining power would, of course, be greatly decreased. See
note 5 supra and accompanying text. The Board left open for future consideration
the question whether union withdrawal from an existing multiemployer unit would
make it unlawful for the former employer-members to lockout as a defense against
union "whipsawing." 1965 CCH NLRB at 16465. See generally notes 145-66 infra
and accompanying text.
117 1965 CCH NLRB at 16465.
218 Id. at 16466.
"
1 9 Id. at 16466.
120 See, e.g., Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 872 F.2d 569, 572 (6th
Cir. 1967).
121 See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
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more restrictive rules for union withdrawal would be arbitrary and
an abuse of discretion in excess of its statutory authority.122
Stated in its simplest terms, the Board's first argument is that the
appropriateness of a multiemployer unit depends upon the mutual
consent of the parties, both at the time of its creation and throughout
the period of its existence. Thus, it logically follows that both unions
and employers are entitled to withdraw by terminating their con-
sent. If one accepts the majority's major premise, its conclusion is,
of course, inescapable. The question, however, remains: Is the
mutual consent premise valid in light of the Board's established
criteria for finding and continuing to recognize the appropriateness
of a multiemployer bargaining unit?123 According to the majority,
the very existence of an appropriate multiemployer unit has always
depended upon mutual consent, because
the Board does not find [such a unit] ...appropriate except
where all the parties dearly agree... or where there has been a
history of bargaining on a multiemployer basis and the employers
and either the incumbent or rival union desire to continue bar-
gaining on such a basis.124
Such a statement, however, inaccurately summarizes the application
of the Board's established multiemployer unit criteria. It obviously
ignores the Checker Cab 25 decision in which neither lack of mutual
consent nor absence of bargaining history prevented the Board from
finding a multiemployer unit appropriate. Furthermore, even if
Checker Cab were viewed as an aberrational case, the majority
erroneously portrayed the Board's bargaining history criterion as
decisive only in those cases where "the employers and either the in-
cumbent or rival union desire to continue bargaining on [a multi-
-
2 Although not expressly stated as such, the abuse of discretion argument is implicit
in the majority opinion. The majority defined the issue presented to be "whether the
Board can or should adopt different, more restrictive, rules to govern a union's with-
drawal from multiemployer units than now exist to govern employer withdrawals."
1965 CCH NLRB at 16464. It then proceeded to quote from opinions of two reviewing
courts indicating that it would be an abuse of discretion for the Board to adopt more
restrictive standards for union than employer withdrawal. Cases cited note 112 supra.
Finally, the majority devoted much of its opinion to refuting the employers' contention
that union withdrawal differed from employer withdrawal to such an extent that the
Board could reasonably adopt more stringent standards to govern that situation.
See 1965 CCH NLRB at 16464-65.
1' See notes 34-93 supra and accompanying text.
124 1965 CCH NLRB at 16464.
.2. 141 N.L.R.B. 583 (1963), enforced, 367 F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1966). See notes 55-60
supra and accompanying text.
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employer] ... basis."'12 6 If this were true, bargaining history would
be irrelevant where there was a dispute between the employers and
a single union, and the employers or the union by withholding
consent could in fact determine the appropriate unit. Recognizing
this possibility, the Board has in several cases relied upon bargaining
history to support the appropriateness of a multiemployer unit
despite the opposition of either an employer or a union. 2 7 Thus,
contrary to the majority's assertion, an appropriate multiemployer
unit has not always been "rooted in consent" of the parties.
Even more difficult to support is the proposition advanced by
the majority that the continued existence of an established multi-
employer unit has always depended upon the "continuing consent"
of the parties.128 The Board itself has said that "the right of with-
drawal ... from a multiemployer unit has never been held.., to
be free and uninhibited, or exercisable at will or whim."'2 9 As the
dissenting member indicated, 30 the right to withdraw has been
limited to the extent that it must be timely, unequivocal, and in
writing;'1' and in the absence of meeting these three requirements
employers have traditionally been included in multiemployer units
despite their protests. 8 2 Of course, in any case in which withdrawal
is permitted there will necessarily be a coincident failure of con-
sent, but those cases in which the Board has held an attempted with-
drawal ineffective13 3 negate the conclusion that mutual consent
aldne is determinative of the continued appropriateness of a multi-
employer unit.
The second argument implicit in the majority opinion appears
more tenable, for two courts have stated that the adoption by the
Board of more restrictive standards to govern union withdrawal than
those applicable to employers would be an abuse of its admin-
istrative discretion. 134 The employers in Evening News had con-
tended that the Board could rationally adopt more restrictive rules
for union withdrawal, because when a union withdraws, its bargain-
22 1965 CCH NLRB at 16464.
127 Cases cited note 65 supra. See notes 25-29 supra and accompanying text.
128 1965 CCH NLRB at 16464.
229 Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 393 (1958).
180 1965 CCH NLRB at 16468.
11 See notes 74-93 supra and accompanying text.
232 E.g., cases cited notes 81, 84-86 supra.
238 Ibid.
a1, Cases cited note 112 supra.
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ing power is enhanced, especially if by doing so it can preclude the
utilization by employers of a multiemployer lockout; whereas when
employers withdraw, their bargaining power is decreased. 13 In
light of recent admonitions from the Supreme Court that the Board
is not "to act at large in equalizing disparities of bargaining power"'13
nor "to deny weapons to one party or the other because of its assess-
ment of that party's bargaining power,"'137 it seems that the majority
properly concluded that the possible effect of union withdrawal on
the relative economic strength of the parties could not alone justify
the Board's adoption of a double withdrawal standard.18 Moreover,
under its established criteria for finding multiemployer units appro-
priate, the Board has never given consideration to the effect that its
unit determination would have on the bargaining power available
to the parties.139
However, even if one accepts the proposition that it would be
an abuse of discretion-in the absence of authority under the act
to consider relative bargaining power-for the Board to restrict union
withdrawal while permitting employers to withdraw at will, 140 the
285 See notes 115-16 supra and accompanying text.
'10 NLRB v. Insurance Agents Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960).
237 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 800, 317 (1965).
138 In view of the declarations by the Supreme Court that the Board is not to be
an arbiter of the bargaining power available to the parties, it is not surprising that
the Second Circuit in a case factually similar to Evening News upheld the Board's
union withdrawal position on review, stating that to require "the Board to weigh
and act on . . . relative bergaining strength ... in determining the appropriateness of
bargaining units, would seem enough of a departure from the general scheme of the
Act to call for explicit statutory provisions." Publishers' Ass'n v. NLRB, 364 F.2d
293, 296 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 885 U.S. 971 (1966).
Relative bargaining power has been criticized as a tool for legal analysis, since when
invoked it is merely a claim by one party that it "should have an increase in bargaining
power relative to another," a claim which may have little relation to the merits of the
dispute. See Meltzer, Single-Employer and Multi-Employer Lockouts Under the Taft-
Hartley Act, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 70, 83 (1956). Moreover, economists have long
criticized the "bargaining power" concept because it "is dependent at least as much
upon what each party is seeking ... as it is upon each party's coercive ability." CHAM-
BERLAIN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 236 (1951). See generally Stigler, The Economist Plays
With Blocs, 44 AM. ECON. REv. (PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS) 7, 14 (1954).
239 1965 CCH NLRB at 16465. See notes 86-60 supra and accompanying text.
140 The Board appears correct in its view that, absent the authority to consider
the relative bargaining power of the parties, it would be irrational and arbitrary to
deny unions the same right as employers to withdraw from existing multiemployer
units. Under existing Board rules employers can effectively destroy an appropriate
multiemployer unit by withdrawing en masse. See, e.g., Swanson Logging Co., 111
N.L.R.B. 495 (1955); Johnson Optical Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 539 (1949). In the case of
either employer or union withdrawal, therefore, the existing multiemployer unit can
be destroyed unilaterally and the withdrawing party forces the other to forego bar-
gaining on a group basis.
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Board is, nonetheless, open to criticism for failing to consider the
obvious alternative to an arbitrary double standard-namely, equal
but stringent restrictions upon both union and employer with-
drawal. 141 In failing to consider this alternative the Board appears
to have become excessively concerned with the consequences of
"inequality of freedom to withdraw"'142 and never to have confronted
the real issue: Whether "the fundamental purpose of the Act to
foster and maintain stability in bargaining relations"' 43 is served
by permitting parties bargaining in an appropriate multiemployer
unit to alter or destroy that unit at will. 44
Even assuming, however, that the Board could, without abusing its discretion, adopt
more restrictive rules to govern union than employer withdrawal, its decision in
Evening News was certainly within its wide administrative discretion. See note 35
supra and accompanying text. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit's decision enforcing the
Board's order in Evening News noted that union withdrawal regulation "is an area
which Congress has confided to the discretion and expertise of the Board, and in which
the Courts may not interfere unless the Board violates the statute or abuses its dis-
cretion." Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 569, 571 (6th Cir.
1967).
141 More restrictive withdrawal standards for both employers and unions would be
consistent with the Board's concern for equality of treatment, since the standards would
apply equally to either party. Moreover, "underlying -the entire statutory scheme
which has been interpreted to authorize [multiemployer units] . . .is the notion that
they serve the important public interest ... as well as the interest of the immediate
parties." Id. at 572; see 44 TExAs L. Rav. 1047 (1966).
The fact that the narrow question of employer withdrawal was not directly before
the Board in Evening News provides little excuse for the Board's failure to consider
the adoption of more restrictive withdrawal standards for both parties. Unless the
Board adopts withdrawal rules applicable to both unions and employers in a case
involving withdrawal by only one party, it may be precluded by its equality of treat-
ment rationale from promulgating more restrictive withdrawal rules in future cases,
since no single case will involve both employer and union withdrawal. Under existing
Board rules where both parties agree withdrawal is permitted despite the restrictions
that would otherwise apply. See notes 90, 92-93 supra and accompanying text.
142See notes -118-19 supra and accompanying text. As the court in enforcing
Evening News indicated, "an analysis of the situation reveals that equality 'of with-
drawal rights is only half of the issue at stake. Besides insuring equal treatment of
unions and employers, ...Board policies should be framed substantively to bolster
the multiemployer unit as an instrument of national policy." Detroit Newspaper Pub-
lishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 1967).
143 Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 393 (1958).
1""Under the Act, multiemployer bargaining units can be accorded the sanctioil
of the Board only insofar as they rest in principle on a relatively stable foundation."
Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 393 (1958). Thus, the Board's primary
consideration in finding and continuing to recognize the appropriateness of such units
must necessarily be the stability in bargaining relations that multiemployer bargaining
under the circumstances would tend to promote or maintain. This is not to deny the
significance of mutual consent, for in many cases the fact that the parties agree to
bargain on a multiemployer basis is probably indicative of a stable bargaining relation-
ship. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. However, there may be situations
where giving determinative weight to consent alone would conflict rather than coincide
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THE CONSEQUENCES OF PERMITTING UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL
FROM -MULTIEMPLOYER BARGAINING UNITS
A. The Effect of Union Withdrawal on the Right of Employers to
Lockout
In 1954 the Board took the position later upheld by the Supreme
Court in NLRB v. Local 449, Teamsters Union (Buffalo Linen)4 ,
that
a strike against one employer-member of a multiemployer bar-
gaining unit constitutes a threat of strike action against the other
employers, which threat, per se ... legally justifies their resort to
a temporary lockout of employees. 146
with the stability in bargaining contempIted by the act. See, e.g., cases cited notes
65, 81, 84, 86 supra. When this is the case the fundamental purpose of the act requires
that the stability of collective bargaining be given priority. Ibid.
... 353 U.S. 87 (1957), reversing 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956), denying enforcement
sub nom. Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954), 57 COLUM. L. Rav. 1172
(1957), 42 VA. L. REv. 684 (1956).
145 109 N.L.R.B. at 448. Prior to Buffalo Linen the Board had held that the
use of a lockout by the nonstruck employer-members of a-multiemployer unit to counter
union "whipsawing" and not as a necessary device to avoid direct economic loss was
an unfair labor practice in the form of an unlawful reprisal against the employees'
protected right to strike. E.g., Davis Furniture Co., 94 N.L.RB. 279 (1951), en-
forcement denied sub nom. Leonard v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1952), on
remand, 100 N.L.R.B. 1016 (1952), enforcement denied sub nom. Leonard v. NLRB,
205 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1953); Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950),
enforcement denied, 190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951), on remand, 99 N.L.R.B. 1448
(1952) (dictum), enforced on other grounds, 204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1953).
Apparently at common law an employer had the right to lockout, or even discharge,
his employees for any reason, so that for all practical purposes the lockout was the
corollary of the right to strike. See, e.g., Iron Moulders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co.,
166 Fed. 45, 50 (7th Cir. 1908) (dictum). Neither the original National Labor Relations
Act (49 Stat. 449 (1935)), nor the Taft-Hartley Amendments (61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1964)) expressly prohibit the lockout. See NLRB v. Local 449,
Teamsters Union, 353 US. 87, 92 (1957). A lockout is only unlawful, therefore, if it is
an unlawful interference, coercion, or restraint of protected employee activity under
§8(a)(1) of the act. See NLRB v. Somerset Shoe Co., 111 F.2d 681, 689 (1st Cir.
1940). Conversely, the lockout is entirely lawful "provided only that the employer's
action is not motivated by a purpose to interfere with and defeat its employees'
union activities." Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 601, 602 (1946); accord, e.g.,
Bisbee Linseed Co., 18 N.L.R.B. 993 (1939). Thus, the Board has held that a lockout
is lawful when motivated by a desire to avoid peculiar economic loss incident to a
strike, such as spoilage of materials, or the threat of recurrent work stoppages which
make continued operations uneconomical. E.g., Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B.
268 (1951); International Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 907 (1951); Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48
N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943). Prior to Buffalo Linen, however, the Board made it dear
that the use of the lockout solely for the purpose of defending against a "whipsaw"
strike was unlawful. E.g., Continental Baking Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 143, 146 (1953)
(dictum), enforcement denied on other grounds, 221 F.2d 427 (Sth Cir. 1955); Davis
Furniture Co., supra; Morand Bros. Beverage Co., supra.
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By permitting the nonstruck employer-members of a multiemployer
unit to lockout, Buffalo Linen combined with later cases provided
employers with a potent defense against union "whipsaw" strike
tactics. 1 47 However, the Board narrowly construed Buffalo Linen as
making the defensive lockout available only to those employers who
are actually members of an appropriate multiemployer unit. In
Evening News Ass'n, 48 for example, it held that a lockout by one
newspaper when another was struck violated sections 8 (a) (1) and
(3) of the act because the two newspapers were not members of an
appropriate multiemployer unit. The Board reasoned that the
Buffalo Linen lockout is permitted only to preserve an existing
multiemployer unit from threatened destruction and was not there-
fore available when such a unit did not exist.14 Shortly after the
Board's decision in Evening News, the Supreme Court in American
Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB15 0 held that a single employer does not
violate the act when, after an impasse in negotiations, he temporarily
locks out his employees "for the sole purpose of bringing economic
pressure to bear in support of his legitimate bargaining position."''
The Court reasoned that a lockout as such is not the sort of employer
'17 After Buffalo Linen the Board continued to recognize the lockout as a legitimate
defensive measure available to the employer-members of a multiemployer unit. See,
e.g., Natkin 9. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 1542 (1965); Publishers' Ass'n, 139 N.L.R.B. 1092
(1962), enforced sub nom. New York Mailers' Union No. 6 v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 292 (2d
Cir. 1964). The Board in post-Buffalo Linen cases held, however, that the tempo-
rary replacement of locked out employees and the continued operation of business was
unlawful. E.g., Missoula Motel Ass'n, 148 N.L.R.B. 1477 (1964); Bagdad Bowling
Alleys, 147 N.L.R.B. 851 (1964); Kroger Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 235 (1963). The Board
reasoned that as long as the non-struck employers did not replace their locked out
employees, they were still arguably defending themselves or the integrity of the multi-
employer unit against "whipsaw" tactics, but that in hiring replacements their
conduct became retaliatory and punished their regular employees for being members
of the striking union. The Supreme Court, however, rejected the Board's reasoning
and concluded that absent specific antiunion motivation the hiring of temporary
replacements and the continued operation of the employer's business was not a viola-
don of the act. NLRB'v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965), affirming 319 F.2d 7 (10th
Cir. 1963), denying enforcement of 137 N.L.R.B. 79 (1962), 17 SYRACUsE L. Rv. 66
(1966), 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 457 (1966).
148 145 N.L.R.B. 996 (1964), enforcement denied sub nom. Detroit Newspaper Pub-
lishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1965), vacated per curiam sub nom.
Newspaper Drivers & Handlers Local 372 v. Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, 382
U.S. 374 (1966). This is an earlier case involving the same employers as in the
principal union withdrawal decision under discussion in this comment.
'10 145 N.L.R.B. at 1001.
1-0 380 U.S. 300 (1965), reversing 331 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1964), enforcing 142
N.L.R.B. 1362 (1963), 1966 DUKE L.J. 261, 64 MICH. L. REv. 910 (1966), 17 SyAmcusE
L. Rav. 66 (1965), 18 VAND. L. Rav. 2056 (1965).
181 380 U.S. at 318.
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action which is so destructive of collective bargaining that the Board
need not inquire into the employer's motivation.152 Therefore, the
Court concluded, "proper analysis of the problem demands that the
simple intention to support the employer's bargaining position...
be distinguished from a hostility to the process of collective bar-
gaining."' 153 On review of the Evening News decision the Sixth Cir-
cuit in Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB,54 reading
American Ship Bldg. to require a demonstration of "antiunion
animus" before a lockout becomes unlawful, denied enforcement of
the Board's order. The court held that absent evidence of hostile
motivation employers bargaining together with the same union
could lawfully lockout to defend against a "whipsaw" strike even if
they are not members of an existing multiemployer unit; for in the
court's opinion such action furthers a legitimate bargaining in-
terest.1 55 The status of Detroit Newspaper Publishers, however,
remains uncertain, since the Supreme Court vacated the decision of
the court of appeals and remanded the case to the Board for recon-
sideration in light of American Ship Bldg.150
Between the time the Sixth Circuit reversed the Board in Detroit
Newspaper Publishers and the Supreme Court's decision to remand
that case, the Board decided in Weyerhauser Co. 157 that even if non-
struck employers are mistaken as a matter of law with respect to their
membership in an appropriate multiemployer unit, a lockout by them
in support of a struck employer is not unlawful. The Board held
that the principles announced by the Supreme Court in American
Ship Bldg.58 and its companion case, NLRB v. Brown,159 apply to
the situation where two or more employers bargain jointly with
the same union and the union strikes only some of the employers,
because "the subsequent lockout by the nonstruck employers in that
112 Id. at 309.
1Ibid.
-' 346 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1965), 15 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 136 (1966).
21 See 346 F.2d at 531-32.
256 Newspaper Drivers & Handlers Local 372 v. Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n,
382 U.S. 374 (1966) (per curiam).
2" 1966 CCH NLRB 25093, remanded sub nom. Western States Regional Council
v. NLRB, 365 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
128 See notes 150-53 supra and accompanying text.
"' 380 U.S. 278 (1965), affirming 319 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1963), denying enforcement
of 137 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962), 17 SYvAcusE L. REv. 66 (1966), 18 U. FLA. L. REv. 457 (1966).
See note 147 supra.
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situation clearly lacks the discriminatory motivation required by the
Court's holdings while it does serve a 'significant employer inter-
est. .... "1610 The Weyerhauser rationale would seem to be equally
applicable to employers who were members of an appropriate multi-
employer unit before union withdrawal. However, Weyerhauser
was remanded to the Board on review by the District of Columbia
Circuit.161
Thus, the question whether the employer's right to lockout to
defend against a "whipsaw" strike will survive withdrawal by the
union from an existing multiemployer unit still remains to be
decided by the Board. The practical consequence of the Board's
decision to permit unilateral union withdrawal from existing multi-
employer bargaining units will, of course, be greatly affected by
that decision. Not only would the value of multiemployer bargain-
ing to employers be significantly diminished without the right to
lockout, but unions would be provided with an enticing incentive
to withdraw whenever it appeared that in upcoming negotiations
their demands would not be met without resort to economic force.
American Ship Bldg. and Brown would seem to provide the Board
with ample precedent to find that former members of a multi-
employer unit have a sufficient bargaining interest, absent evidence
of antiunion animus, to lock out in order to counter union "whip-
saw" tactics. 62
'16 1966 CCH NLR.B at 25094.
261 Western States Regional Council v. NLRB, 365 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The
court of appeals remanded the case to the Board for "findings which give some
assurance that [the] . . . interpretation of the statute is neither remote nor misty in
relation to its factual coordinates." Id. at 939. The court was troubled in two
respects with the Weyerhauser decision. First, the Trial Examiner had found that the
employers were members of an appropriate multiemployer unit and therefore entitled
to lockout under Buffalo Linen. See notes 145-46 supra and accompanying text. The
Board, however, instead of considering the appropriateness of the multiemployer unit,
noted that the Trial Examiner's opinion preceded American Ship Bldg. and Brown
(see notes 150-53, 159 supra and accompanying text) and found those decisions to be
controlling. The Board held, therefore, that it was unnecessary to determine whether
or not a multiemployer unit did in fact exist, for in either case the employers had
acted lawfully. Secondly, the court was apparently disturbed by the fact that the
General Counsel. of the Board had argued before the Supreme Court in support of the
Board's Evening News lockout decision, contending that American Ship Bldg. did not
in that case give the employer in one unit the privilege of locking out in support of
the bargaining position of the employer in another. See note 153 supra and accom-
panying text. In view of the foregoing the court concluded that "the Board may or
may not be right . . . but [its] . . . position is, at least, ambiguous." 365 F.2d at
937.
112 There are indications that the Board in light of American Ship Bldg. and
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Even if it is assumed that former members of a multiemployer
unit are held entitled to lock out after a union has withdrawn, the
lockout problems presented by Evening News are not entirely solved.
The question which immediately arises is whether a union could
not, over a period of time after withdrawing from the multiemployer
unit, negotiate staggered contract expiration dates with the various
employers' 63 and thereby effectively block the use of the lockout by
the nonstruck employers. Arguably a union could do so, if it
could also negotiate into its collective bargaining agreements the
standard clause providing for no lockout by the employer during
the contract term. Furthermore, even without such a clause em-
ployers might be precluded by staggered contract termination dates
from using a bargaining lockout. American Ship Bldg. sanctions
lockouts only in support of a legitimate bargaining interest. 0 4
Whether nonstruck employers not engaged in negotiations at the
same time could lock out thus appears doubtful, especially in light
of the Board's recent decision in David Friedland Painting Co.,10
holding that an employer, although affected economically by the out-
come of a labor dispute involving other employers, could not lock
out its employees belonging to the union involved, since it "was not
in bargaining negotations with the union ... and therefore was not
concerned about advancing its own bargaining position."' 66
Brown may be compelled to hold that the former members of a multiemployer unit
have the right to use a counter-defensive lockout even after union withdrawal. In
Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 872 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1967), for example,
the court stated: "We do not say that after withdrawal from the unit the unions could
with impunity conduct a whipsaw strike against one of the publishers and that the
other would be powerless to exercise its economic weapon of a lockout .... [W]here
the lockout is to support an employer's legitimate bargaining position, he could no
more be deprived of its use than the right to strike could be taken away from the
employees. This... is implicit in Buffalo Linen, Brown and American Ship Building."
Id. at 572.
168 The duration of a collective bargaining agreement, as one of the substantive
terms of a bargaining agreement, is a matter upon which the parties are required to
bargain in good faith. See, e.g., United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 298
F.2d 873, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 919 (1962), enforcing sub nom. United Steel Workers,
AFL-CIO, 129 N.L.R.B. 357 (1960); Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 647 (1959);
Hinde & Dauch Paper Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 847 (1953). Moreover, duration is among those
mandatory subjects for bargaining on which neither party is legally obligated to yield.
NLRB v. Yutana Barge Lines, Inc., 315 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1963); United Steel Workers,
AFL-CIO, supra.
26, See note 151 supra and accompanying text.
116 1966 CCH NLRB 25841.
116 Id. at 25843. (Emphasis added.)
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B. The Effect of Unilateral Withdrawal Upon the Stability of Col-
lective Bargaining
Perhaps a more fudamental consideration than employers' lock-
out rights is the effect of permitting unilateral withdrawal from
existing multiemployer bargaining units upon the stability of col-
lective bargaining relations. In formulating rules to govern em-
ployer withdrawal from multiemployer units, the Board has con-
cerned itself with preventing the instability which would ensue if the
parties at the time of negotiations could not be certain whether a
multiemployer unit was appropriate. 167 It has, therefore, required
that employer withdrawal be unequivocally made in writing prior
to the commencement of negotiations for a new multiemployer
contract. 6 Since these same requirements are made applicable to
union withdrawal under Evening News, 69 uncertainty as to the
appropriate bargaining unit during negotiations should be no
greater than that previously existing.
However, a more serious type of instability, namely, increased
industrial strife, may result from permitting either party to alter or
destroy virtually at will an existing multiemployer unit. Because
multiemployer bargaining reduces the resort to economic force in
labor relations 70 Congress has recognized it as "a vital factor in the
effectuation of the national policy of promoting labor peace ....
By limiting its restrictions on withdrawal from existing multi-
employer units to the time and manner of occurrence, the Board has
neglected the instability in collective bargaining which may result
from the destruction of the multiemployer unit itself.172 It may be
that in situations where multiemployer bargaining has not become
established, or in those in which it has not been successful in sta-
bilizing collective bargaining between the parties, the imposition
of the requirement upon unwilling parties that they continue to
utilize the multiemployer device would produce, as the Evening
News majority emphasized, "not stability, but friction and instability
211 See notes 70-71 supra and accompanying text.
168 See notes 79-93 supra and accompanying text.
162 See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
170 Witte, Economic Aspects of Industry-Wide Collective Bargaining, in INDUSTMY-
WIDE COLLECrIVE BARGAINING: PROMISE OR MENACE 53 (Warne ed. 1950). See note 2
supra and accompanying text.
'71 NLRB v. Local 449, Teamsters Union, 353 U.S. 87, 95 (1957).
a72 See Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 569, 572 (6th Cir.
1967); note 2 supra and accompanying text.
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in the bargaining unit."' 73 On the other hand, it would appear
that in those cases where multiemployer bargaining has been espe-
cially effective in stabilizing labor relations, or where it is peculiarly
adapted to the exigencies of the particular industry,174 unilateral
destruction of the existing multiemployer unit may well lead to
instability in collective bargaining relations.175
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Board's decision in Evening News may well jeopardize the
utility of the multiemployer bargaining unit as a stabilizing force in
labor relations.'"0 Not only is there the possibility that unions may
be able to preclude the use of the Buffalo Linen lockout 77 by a
group of employers, but both the union and the employers now have
the right to destroy a successful and stable bargaining relationship
without any justification. Moreover, having the right to withdraw
unilaterally, both parties, but particularly the union, have a power-
ful bargaining lever in the mere threat of withdrawal. 78
Basically, it is the Board's duty to determine in each case the
appropriate bargaining unit under section 9 (b) of the act 17 and to
implement the fundamental policy of the act by fostering and main-
taining stability in collective bargaining relationships.8 0  Yet by lim-
iting its inquiry in Evening News to whether it should adopt more
restrictive rules for union withdrawal than those applicable to em-
ployers, the Board has in effect vested in the parties the power to
determine the appropriate unit"8 ' and has disregarded the resultant
178 1965 CCH NLRB at 16466.
117 See note 4 supra.
175 See Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 872 F.2d 569, 572 (6th Cir.
1967), enforcing sub nom. Evening News Ass'n, 1965 CCH NLRB 16462; id. at 16467
(dissenting opinion).
178 See authorities cited note 172 supra.
177See notes 145-66 supra and accompanying text.
18 Since both employers and unions gain from bargaining on a multiemployer
basis (see notes 4-11 supra and accompanying text), the mere threat of unilateral
withdrawal may be a potent bargaining weapon. This is especially true of the threat
of union withdrawal, because employers often depend upon multiemployer bargain-
ing to enhance their bargaining power. See notes 4-5 supra and accompanying text.
179 See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
8o See note 143 supra and accompanying text.
I"1 The Board's willingness to permit unilateral withdrawal from multiemployer
units appears inconsistent with its reluctance under its multiemployer unit certifica-
tion criteria to vest in either party the power to determine the appropriate unit. See
notes 26-33 supra and accompanying text.
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deleterious effects upon the stability of collective bargaining. 182 The
Board's excessive concern with the consensual nature of multi-
employer bargaining 18 3 and inequality of treatment of the parties84
has precluded it from considering other, perhaps more reasonable,
alternatives.
There would appear to be at least two methods by which the
Board could have avoided the undesirable consequences of its
Evening News decision without considering directly the relative
bargaining power of the parties or the economic weapons that should
be available to each. One approach would have been for the Board
expressly to have adopted new, more restrictive standards for both
union and employer withdrawal. 8 5  The power of the Board to
proceed in this manner in order to maintain and promote stability
in collective bargaining is certainly within its "wide administrative
discretion"'186 and is supported by ample Board precedent. 187  The
"balancing of conflicting interest" test suggested by Member Brown
in his dissent in Evening News, 88 if applied to both union and em-
ployer withdrawal, would appear to be a workable criterion. Un-
der this test the Board would take into consideration the length and
character of the multiemployer bargaining history, the nature of
employment practices in the industry, common control of-or partici-
pation in labor relations, the party's reasons for withdrawal, and the
instability, if any, that would be likely to result if withdrawal were
permitted. The question in each case would be whether under all
the circumstances unilateral withdrawal would tend to have such a
harmful impact on the bargaining relationship that it should not
be permitted under the stability requirement of the act.
182 See notes 144, 167-75 supra and accompanying text.
'18 See notes 124-33 supra and accompanying text.
"
8 See notes 118-19, 142 supra and accompanying text.
15 See note 141 supra and accompanying text.
186 See note 35 supra.
167 The purpose of the act to foster and maintain order and stability in industrial
relations has been the justification for the Board's present minimal restrictions on
withdrawal from multiemployer units. See Quality Limestone Prods., Inc., 1965 CCH
NLRB 16086, 16088; Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 393-94 (1958); Engineer-
ing Metals Prods. Corp., 92 N.L.R.B. 823, 824 (1950); note 73 supra and accompanying
text. In imposing more restrictive standards for both union and employer withdrawal
"the Board would exercise the same authority which it has in imposing a condition that
withdrawals be timely and unequivocal." Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v.
NLRB, 372 F.2d 569, 571 (6th Cir. 1967).
18 1965 CCH NLRB at 16469. The balancing of conflicting interest articulation
of the Board's function finds support in NLRB v. Local 449, Teamsters Union, 353
U.S. 87, 96 (1957).
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The Board could have accomplished substantially the same
result by more broadly interpreting its traditional requirement
that withdrawal be "unequivocal" and in "good faith"""0 to pro-
hibit unilateral withdrawal from existing multiemployer units when
made for ulterior motives not related to an honest or genuine
desire to forego "with relative permanence" bargaining on a multi-
employer basis.190 Thus, withdrawal used merely as a momentary
bargaining strategy, or to avoid a defensive lockout, would be in-
effective as equivocal and not in good faith. Such a holding would
not appear to be a great departure, if any, from available precedent;
for the Board in several cases has indicated that withdrawal will not
be permitted if used merely as a measure of "momentary expedience,
or strategy in bargaining."' 9'
In applying either of the foregoing tests the Board would neither
abdicate its authority to determine the appropriate unit, nor ignore
the fundamental purpose of the act.
189 See notes 82-86 supra and accompanying text.
'
11oIn Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1967),
the court stated that "it would seem ... that the Board could with propriety inquire
into the good faith of withdrawals and whether they are harmful to either party,




1 See cases cited notes 85-96 supra.
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